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Abstract 
This study looks at effectual and causal logics in entrepreneurial decision-making. We 
have compared entrepreneurially educated novices with expert entrepreneurs using 
think-aloud protocols to determine differences in their effectual logics and expertise 
in general. Prior research suggests that experts are more likely to take an effectual 
approach when solving problems (Sarasvathy, 2008; Dew et al., 2009). We sampled 
three recently entrepreneurially educated novices and three expert entrepreneurs. 
Having them continuously think-aloud as they solved standard decision-making 
problems in creating a new venture compared their decision-making processes. 
Results showed that entrepreneurially educated novices were substantially more 
effectual than initially expected and more effectual than the experts in our study. 
These findings provide implications and a basis for further research as to whether 
effectual logic is something that entrepreneurship students naturally possess, learn 
during their studies, or whether this is a natural developmental stage for becoming an 
expert entrepreneur. 
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1. Introduction 
Around the turn of the millennium, Saras Sarasvathy (2001) introduced her 
framework on effectuation and causation, which has since gained ground as one of the 
fundamental theories in entrepreneurial research. An effectual process starts with 
someone looking at who one is, what one has, and what one knows before making a 
decision by choosing among the possible outcomes. Effectuators see the world as still 
in-the-making, and focus on making success happen rather than avoiding failure 
(Sarasvathy, 2008). A causal process involves setting a goal and modifying whom, 
what and how accordingly to achieve the goal. Moreover, Sarasvathy claimed that 
novices used causal reasoning to a higher degree, whilst experts leaned on their 
previously gained knowledge and made decisions in a more effectual manner, 
affecting the future rather than trying to predict it. 
 
In recent years, extensive research comparing decision-making logics between expert 
entrepreneurs and other groups has been conducted (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy, 
2008; Dew et al., 2009). Dew et al. (2009) researched effectual and predictive logics 
in entrepreneurial decision-making by comparing expert entrepreneurs with novices 
who graduated from MBA programs. The researchers interviewed 64 subjects to find 
out the difference in their thought processes when solving a case about setting up an 
imaginary company, using think-aloud protocols. Their results showed a clear 
difference in the use of effectuation and causation between the two groups, with 
experts being much more effectual. 
 
“Expert entrepreneurs, … , under-weighted, ignored and even explicitly argued against 
taking predictions seriously, working instead with things within their control even if that 
meant effectuating, e.g., changing their initial goals and visions for the venture…. (while) 
the MBA students picked target segments based on predictive information given to them 
and followed textbook procedures in arriving at decisions on how to capture the target 
segments.” 
(Dew et al., 2009. p.288) 
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In this study, we attempt to build on the research by Dew et al. (2009) titled: 
‘Effectual versus predictive logics in entrepreneurial decision-making: differences 
between experts and novices’. We want to compare and analyze the decision-making 
logics of entrepreneurially educated novices (EENs) and experts when starting a 
venture. We have defined EENs as entrepreneurship graduates who have started their 
own venture in the last 3 years. This does not include students who have attended ad-
hoc courses oriented towards self-employment and/or new venture creation but solely 
graduates from formal entrepreneurship programs at a Masters level. What 
characterizes these individuals as a distinct group of novice entrepreneurs is that they 
have all studied how to perform like entrepreneurs, and may have an edge on novices 
who have not formally studied entrepreneurship. EENs serve as an interesting 
replacement group for MBA students due to the polar goals of the programs. MBA 
programs are often designed more towards teaching students to run large companies 
(a more casual process), while entrepreneurship programs are designed to teach 
students how to start companies (a more effectual process). In our research, we expect 
that EENs will still be more causal in their decision-making than the experts, as 
novices tend to be more causal than experts (Sarasvathy, 2008). From this, we have 
identified the research gap as to determine where EENs sit on the causal to effectual 
logic scale compared to expert entrepreneurs. 
 
It is important to fill this research gap for three reasons: Firstly, all experts were 
originally novices and it is important to see if entrepreneurship education brings 
EENs close to experts in their decision-making logics. This is important because there 
have been huge investments by government bodies, organizations and business 
leaders in educational programs to move people from beginners to experts (World 
Economic Forum, 2014). Secondly, we believe EENs are a good research group to see 
how they differ in their approach and reasoning to Dew et al.’s (2009) MBA students. 
Their study pointed out that MBA programs do not do a good job of educating 
entrepreneurs. This has been shown by both anecdotal wisdom, and the popular 
literature on entrepreneurship (Dew et al., 2009). Finally, we see the need to analyze 
the differences between novice and expert entrepreneurs to identify if there is a gap 
and how that affects aspiring entrepreneurs 
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Therefore, our research question is:  
Do EENs and experts have similar decision-making logics when starting a new 
venture? 
 
Our study is a comparison study with Dew et al.’s (2009) research. We had three 
expert entrepreneurs and three EENs solve a modified version of the case used in 
Dew et al.’s comparison study. The case was modified to fit a Swedish setting 
because all participants were located and worked in Sweden. Since expertise in 
entrepreneurship is contextual and specific to the domain of entrepreneurship 
(Ericsson and Smith, 1991), the case used was an attempt to be as unbiased as 
possible. This was done by entrepreneurship itself being the product for which the 
subjects had to identify/create a market for.   
 
We expect EENs in this study to demonstrate less in every measure of the following 
effectual traits due to their lack of experience within the field of entrepreneurship 
when compared to our experts: 
Expertise in general: 
• The number of words they use (Analogical reasoning) 
• How many new markets and segments they identify (Analogical reasoning) 
• Do they look at and deal with the venture as a whole (Holistic and conceptual 
thinking) 
• How much they question the given market research data  (Weighting of 
predictive information) 
Entrepreneurial expertise: 
• How many times they draw on personal experience (Means vs. Goals) 
• Their concerns regarding project affordability (Affordable loss vs. Expected 
returns) 
• If they look for partnerships (Partnerships vs. Competition)  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Next we move to the theoretical framework and look 
into effectuation and causation, and especially effectual logic. Then we look at 
research on entrepreneurship, and specifically expertise in entrepreneurship and 
expert entrepreneurs before we look at entrepreneurially educated novices (EENs). 
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After the theoretical framework we turn our focus to the methodology of our research, 
the design of the study, samples and measures to clarify how the research was done. 
Results will follow where we go over our main findings and link them with existing 
research, adding to the discussion and offering our conclusions. Towards the end we 
look at limitations before suggesting opportunities for further research. We conclude 
with references and appendixes, including the case (Appendix A) and coding scheme 
(Appendix B). 
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2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Effectuation and causation 
Read and Sarasvathy (2005) claim that the effectuation theory developed by 
Sarasvathy (Sarasvathy, 2001) was a first attempt to develop a foundation of 
entrepreneurial expertise. The effectuation process is the inversion of causal 
rationality, it is enactive and exaptive as opposed to the reactive and adaptive nature 
of causal and rationality (Read and Sarasvathy, 2005). 
 
According to Sarasvathy (2001), the effectuation process does not begin with a 
specific goal, much like a cook who makes a meal based on what he has in the kitchen 
and his own cooking skills. A causal process is when the venture is envisioned from 
the beginning and all efforts are directed at achieving the pre-envisioned state 
(Chandler et al., 2011). Much like a chef who decides on the menu first before 
looking what he has in the kitchen. 
 
“Causal strategies are useful when the future is predictable, goals are clear and the environment is 
independent of our actions; effectual strategies are useful when the future is unpredictable, goals are 
unclear and the environment is driven by human action.” 
(Sarasvathy, 2008, p.73) 
 
In real life settings, causal and effectual approaches are not necessarily an either or. In 
fact, Gustafsson (2004) found that expert entrepreneurs are capable of using both 
modes well depending on the circumstances. Both approaches can occur 
simultaneously and often overlap in different contexts of actions and decisions made 
by the entrepreneur every day (Sarasvathy, 2001). It is therefore impossible to be 
exclusively either effectual or causal, although experienced people tend to use more 
effectuation when solving a problem within their range of expertise. Sarasvathy 
(2008) found that experts prefer effectual actions when starting new ventures, and 
may not transition well into causal reasoning when the venture matures. 
 
The effectuation theory developed by Sarasvathy (2001) was the first attempt to 
develop theories focusing solely on entrepreneurial expertise. Larkin et al. (1980) 
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found that experts tend to be forward thinking (effectual reasoners) taking 
information cues to make actions, while novices tend to be backward thinkers (causal 
reasoners) using information cues to validate the actions they took. 
 
2.1.1 Causal and effectual positions 
As stated earlier, we intend to look at how expert entrepreneurs and EENs make 
decisions differently. Dew et al. (2009) showed that expert entrepreneurs were in fact 
more effectual than their less experienced counterparts. We intend to look at the 
elements of causal and effectual positions to see if our experts are more effectual than 
our EENs in their decision-making when starting a new venture. To do this we will 
focus on expertise in general and three positions of effectual logic. 
Means-driven vs. Goal-driven action 
The core of an effectual means-driven approach, or the bird-in-hand principle, is 
beginning with a given set of means. It is focusing on who I am, what I know, and 
whom I know (Sarasvathy, 2001; Dew et al., 2009). The effectual entrepreneur asks 
himself what effects he can create with the means he has, while the causal 
entrepreneur would ask himself what resources he ought to accumulate to achieve the 
desired goals (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005). 
 
For example, a company could build on a staff member's previous experience in a 
different industry and use his knowledge and networks as the starting point for a new 
project. A causal, goal-based company would form specific expectations derived from 
its predetermined roadmap (Brettel et al., 2012). 
 
Affordable loss vs. Expected returns 
Focusing on risking no more than you can afford to lose is an effectual view. It is 
common among successful expert entrepreneurs who limit the risk when building 
their venture. A causal entrepreneur is more likely to calculate the expected maximum 
return and choose between options to reach that objective (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005; 
Brettel et al., 2012).  
 
An example of this is the causal entrepreneur who doesn’t leave his job until he sees 
an opportunity that he believes will pay more. In contrast, the effectual entrepreneur 
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invests some of his savings to pursue a project worth his time and money regardless 
of whether it will pay more than his current job (Dew et al., 2009). 
 
Partnerships vs. Competitive analysis 
To reduce uncertainty, effectual entrepreneurs erect entry barriers and co-create the 
new market. They involve customers, suppliers and even prospective competitors to 
form strategic alliances (Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005; Brettel et al., 
2012). A causal approach would be reducing the uncertainty through competitive 
market analysis (Brettel et al. 2012) and limiting relationships to what is absolutely 
necessary (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005). 
 
An example of this would be an effectual entrepreneur who invents a new soft drink 
and co-operates with ‘big players’ in the market to use their networks and marketing 
structure to promote it. A causal approach would be trying to exploit competitors’ 
weaknesses and going alone. 
2.2 What is Entrepreneurship? 
Perhaps the largest obstacle in creating a conceptual framework for the 
entrepreneurship field has been its definition, which has been difficult for scholars to 
agree on. Unlike chess or music the very definition of entrepreneurship has been 
unclear (Sarasvathy, 2008). Defining an entrepreneur as solely a person who starts 
new ventures, does not take into account the variation in the different opportunities 
people identify. This often leads to researchers not measuring opportunities in their 
research (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Chandler and Lyon (2001) say that one of 
the strengths of entrepreneurship is that it borrows freely from the "tool-kits” of other 
social sciences making it hard to agree on a strict definition. 
 
Landes et al. (2010) said that entrepreneurs have always existed in human history and 
have been a major driving force for economic prosperity. However, there is no way to 
explain entrepreneurship without looking at the situations entrepreneurs find 
themselves in (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Dew et al. (2009) define 
entrepreneurship as the creation of new ventures, products and markets and we will, 
for the sake of our study, use the same definition. 
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Since the term is vague, it is important to point out that there are different types of 
entrepreneurs. For example, social or business entrepreneurs who range from novices 
to experts. But what is an expert and how can you become one? A certain number of 
years in the field does not make you an expert. If we compare experts in 
entrepreneurship to professional football players in the English Premier League, it is 
safe to say that all of the players are experts in their field, playing at the highest level. 
Although all experts, their skills vary greatly and the difference between the best, 
average and poor players is vast. Years of experience or number of games played 
don’t necessarily indicate top performance. We argue that the same is true for 
entrepreneurs. The number of companies started or years of experience does not 
determine success. We feel that the difference in how experts and novices make 
decisions needs to be explored. 
2.3 Expertise and expert entrepreneurs 
Read and Sarasvathy (2005) say that entrepreneurship can be seen as a form of 
expertise, where expert entrepreneurs have a certain set of skills, models and 
processes that they acquire with time and deliberate practice.  An expert is someone 
who has attained a high level of performance in the domain as a result of years of 
experience (Foley & Hart, 1992) and deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 1993). But 
expertise in entrepreneurship does not automatically equal success (Read and 
Sarasvathy, 2005). Experts can still fail and novices can succeed. This is probably 
more true in the context of entrepreneurship than anywhere else. For example, an 
entrepreneurs first company could be very successful but someone playing tennis for 
the first time is unlikely to beat a professional tennis player.  
 
When we compare experts and novices in regards to entrepreneurial research, it is 
unanimous that most experts use effectual reasoning more than most novices 
(Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy, 2008; Dew et al., 2009). Dew et al. (2009) point out 
that experts draw from a larger mental database of actual experiences and have better 
access to this knowledge. According to Feltovich et al. (2006), novices often have 
their short-term memory overloaded, which makes it harder for them to access 
available knowledge relevant to the situation. 
 
 
12 
As entrepreneurship is a broad field with contextual expertise it must be investigated 
in entrepreneurial settings (Ericsson and Smith, 1991; Read and Sarasvathy, 2005) 
just like an expert athlete should be examined in their sport. However, experts often 
use their expertise in general to solve new issues in their ventures (Dew et al., 2009).  
 
“Domain-specific experience is one key in the movement from novice to expert.” 
(Schenk et al, 1998, p.12) 
 
We look into three categories when analyzing differences due to expertise in general. 
The first is analogical reasoning, which refers to solving new problems by building on 
past experience. Analogical reasoning is a strategy when transferring existing 
knowledge from one domain to another (Gregan-Paxton, J. and Cote, J., 2000). 
Markman et al. (2011) claim that the key to analogical problem solving is finding 
known problems that have the same structure as the problem being solved. This can 
be measured by how much respondents talk, if they go beyond the data given and if 
they visualize alternative target segments. The second indicator is holistic and 
conceptual thinking, which refers to looking at the problem as a whole. Experts tend 
to solve problems more holistically than their novice counterparts. Klein (1998) found 
that expert firefighters look at the scene of a fire as a whole by examining its cause 
and likely evolution. The third way we evaluate expertise in general is by looking at 
the weighting of (predictive) information. Experts develop much of their knowledge 
in domain-relevant situations by trial and error. Paradoxically, most novices derive 
their knowledge from the context of practice problems, which are divorced from the 
real world (Schenk et al., 1998). 
 
"Expert entrepreneurs achieve success, namely through failure management. Sustained performance 
over long periods of time requires that experts outlive failures, cumulate successes, and learn from 
both.” 
(Sarasvathy, 2008, p.14) 
 
Since experts have often learned from failing, they should be more likely to doubt 
information given. They trust their gut in particular situations rather then relying on 
what the textbooks say.  
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2.3.1 Entrepreneurial expertise 
Expert entrepreneurs differ from their novice counterparts in their entrepreneurial 
expertise because of their deliberate practice in the field (Gustafsson, 2004). When 
attempting to explain entrepreneurial expertise, we look into the work of expert 
performance in chess, which began over 40 years ago (Chase and Simon, 1973; 
Simon and Chase, 1973). The first person to carry out extensive experiments on 
problem solving was Adriaan de Groot (1978) who used chess as the task for 
research. His subjects varied from novice chess players to chess grandmasters 
(experts). Groot found that the players’ results were similar in every sense, except that 
experts usually chose the strongest move (Simon and Chase, 1973).  
 
According to Dew et al. (2009) an expert entrepreneur has attained reliably superior 
performance in a particular domain within entrepreneurship, taken at least 1 venture 
public (IPO), started (on average) 7 ventures and has entrepreneurial experience of 
over (on average) 20 years. However, due to the context and constrains of our study 
our definition of an expert entrepreneur is someone who has significant knowledge in 
his field of work (with deliberate practice), has been involved in entrepreneurial 
activity for at least 10 years and started at least 3 ventures. 
 
“Entrepreneurial knowledge ultimately derives from a mix of individual experience, connections within 
networks, learning from others, and blind variations.” 
(Sarasvathy, 2008, p.8) 
 
One of the skills expert entrepreneurs have acquired though their years of experience 
and growth of their ventures is knowing when to use the appropriate approach. 
Sarasvathy (2008) predicts that most enduring high-growth firms began effectually. 
Once they grow they have to become more causal to maintain their status and build 
long-term competitive advantages. She argues most enduring firms will not be run by 
their original founders due to the transition from effectual to causal approaches.  
 
“The transition could happen in two ways: expert entrepreneurs, after one or more botched attempts, 
will realize they do not like or are incapable of using causal approaches, and so will either quit or pass 
the reins to more professional management; or they will be fired by venture capitalists or other major 
stakeholders and replaced with professional management.” 
(Sarasvathy, 2008, p.133) 
 
14 
We believe Sarasvathy is missing a very important third way this transition could 
happen. The original founder could adapt to the company’s transition, being forced to 
use more causal approaches when the venture matures, and choosing appropriate 
logics in different situations. 
 
Greeno and Simon (1988) say that most experts learn by doing. Dewey (2004) and 
Mieg (2001) both argued that doing isn’t enough and we don’t learn from our 
experience but from reflecting on it and simply being in the field is not enough. 
Experience of at least 10 years is widely accepted to be the minimum amount of 
deliberate practice in a certain activity to be considered an expert (Ericsson et al., 
1993). According to Ericsson and Lehmann (1996), deliberate practice is the 
immersion in the activity, which enables the cognitive adaptation for learning and 
skill acquisition. Ericsson et al., (1993) identify five necessary requirements of 
deliberate practice which superior expert performance is built on. These pillars are 
motivation, understandability, feedback, repetition and fit. However, experience or 
practice alone doesn’t appear to lead to maximal performance but the level can be 
increased as a result of deliberate efforts to improve. Deliberate practice is, according 
to Ericsson et al. (1993) a highly structured activity where performance is monitored 
carefully, the process is not necessarily enjoyable but it has the explicit goal of 
improving ones performance.  
 
These five key points are important in making the experts different from novices, 
regardless of whether the activity consists of playing chess or mastering an Olympic 
sport. It is the complete focus that is required for accumulation of expertise. 
 
This doesn’t fully explain how expertise is attained and how the bridge from being a 
novice to an expert is built. Is the entrepreneurial expertise attained through time, 
deliberate practice, education, or a mix of all three? 
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3. Method 
Dew et al. (2009) compared 27 expert entrepreneurs with 37 MBA students who’s 
primary experience were managerial roles in large and complex organizations. Their 
backgrounds spanned a wide range of occupations with 87% never having founded a 
firm. 
 
With the increased supply and demand for entrepreneurship education at university 
level, more and more people are graduating with degrees in entrepreneurship. When 
we mention EENs, we refer to entrepreneurship graduates from programs at a Masters 
level who have started their own venture in the last 3 years. 
 
Experts are overall more effectual than novices in their decision-making. According 
to Sarasvathy (2008) 89% of experts prefer an effectual approach, while novices 
prefer causal approaches 81% of the time. 
 
In sum, we expect expert entrepreneurs to be more effectual in their decision-making 
than EENs. 
 
We have chosen to conduct think-aloud protocols on two groups, using the coding 
scheme first developed by Dew et al. (2009). We will then add to our protocols by 
using qualitative research methods to back up the data. This proved running a 
quantitative study akin to Dew et al.’s (2009) invalid due to problems associated with 
between and within group differences. To overcome these restraints, the think-aloud 
protocols were coupled with qualitative content analysis on our participants’ answers. 
We believe this qualitative approach will help us develop a deeper understanding and 
discussion over our results than that of Dew et al.’s (2009) work. We modified the 
case by changing the currency from USD to SEK and company names to fit the 
Swedish context. 
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3.1 Design  
In all six interviews the investigators presented a case with detailed description of the 
imaginary product ‘Venturing’ to the subjects (See Appendix 1 for the actual 
instrument given). Venturing is an imaginary game of entrepreneurship where 
participants must make decisions after receiving realistic information about the 
company and environment. First, our participants were asked to read aloud the 
information presented and then describe how they would build on this information to 
create their venture. Secondly, the participants were provided with market research, 
and asked specific questions in regards to building the venture. Both experts and 
EENs worked on the same case. The participants were asked to think-aloud during 
this entire process and were recorded. Interactions between the investigators and 
subjects were kept to a minimum. The study took 30-45 minutes to complete, without 
time pressure. It was then transcribed and coded using think-aloud protocols (the 
complete coding scheme can be found in Appendix B).  
 
3.1.1 Think-Aloud Protocol Analysis 
Think-aloud protocols (TAP) were coded to analyze the data. TAP has emerged as a 
practical tool and gained acceptance as a viable method for studying thinking and 
decision-making (Crutcher, 1994; Payne, 1994; Wilson, 1994; Ericsson and Simon, 
1998; Ericsson, 2006). TAP is widely accepted as the best method for exploring the 
connection between actual thoughts and verbal reports (Ericsson, 2006). It calls for 
participants to concurrently verbalize their thought processes as they make decisions 
(Ericsson and Simon, 1980). Since expert entrepreneurs are usually good storytellers 
(Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001), studies based on their stories may be subject to 
retrospective bias, which we wanted to avoid. TAP allows researchers a real-time 
look into the black box of cognitive processing because of the structure of the brain’s 
short term memory system, as opposed to only analyzing decision outcomes (Ericsson 
and Simon, 1980; Sarasvathy, 2008). 
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3.2 Sample 
Protocols were collected from three expert entrepreneurs and three entrepreneurially 
educated novices (EENs). Table 1: Descriptive statistics of individual subjects, 
 provides descriptive statistics of individual subjects, while Table 2: Descriptive 
statistics of the expert and EEN samples, provides descriptive statistics of the expert 
and EEN samples.  
 
The experts in our study (see Table 1: Descriptive statistics of individual subjects) 
were between the ages of 36 and 53, have all worked for their ventures for more than 
10 years and have all sold more than one of their ventures. The comparison group of 
EENs (see Table 1: Descriptive statistics of individual subjects) were between the 
ages of 26 and 31 and have all received a M.Sc. in Entrepreneurship in the past 3 
years. They have started 1 to 3 ventures, are currently involved with running their 
own and have not sold any. Our definition of EENs was advantageous as we were 
able to set a benchmark of education level amongst our novices. There are many 
courses that novice entrepreneurs are subjected to, so by taking EENs, we hope to 
achieve a more level playing field. A sample of random novice entrepreneurs was 
deemed to have too much variation in their experience and education. 
 
For the purpose of this study and to protect the identity of our subjects we have 
replaced their names. The experts in our study were given names that start with the 
letter E (for expert) while our EENs were given names with the letter N (for novice).  
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Descriptive statistics of individual subjects 
Name Age Years since graduation/  Years worked Ventures Ventures  
  Univ. academic background for ventures started  sold 
EENs: 
Nick 26  1   N/A  1  0 
Nathan 31  3   N/A  3  0 
Nolan 26  1   N/A  2  0 
Experts: 
Edward 56 2 years of engineering  23  3  2 
Eric 36 M.Sc Computer Science  13  3  2 
Ethan 53 English maj./Psychology min. 33  7  3  
Table 1 
 
Descriptive statistics of the expert and EEN samples 
Variable    Mean  S.D.  Minimum Maximum 
Entrepreneurially educated novice subjects (N=3) 
Year of birth   1986  2.89  1988  1983 
Ventures created   2  1  1  3 
Years since graduation  1.67  1.15  1  3 
 
Expert entrepreneurs subjects (N=3) 
Year of birth   1967  9.8  1978  1961 
Ventures created   4  2.3  3  7 
Years worked for         
those ventures   23  10  13  33 
Table 2 
 
3.3 Method of Analysis 
To stay in line with the previous research we adopted the same coding scheme as used 
in Dew et al.’s (2009) work. The coding scheme has the ability to extract relevant 
variables and counts into three desired categories. Namely, expert-EEN differences in 
general, domain specific differences in regards to marketing, and domain specific 
differences in starting new ventures. General differences were focused around the 
number of words spoken and theorizing from previous experience. Marketing 
variables involved the selection of different market segments, channels, prices and so 
on. New venture differences focused on factors such as resource constraints when 
pursuing opportunities in the case. After the interviews were transcribed, both 
researchers coded the TAP independently. Results were compared and any 
inconsistencies resolved. 
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4. Results 
We expected our EENs to be less effectual than our expert entrepreneurs in each of 
the six categories (analogical reasoning, holistic and conceptual thinking, weighting 
of predictive information, means driven approach, affordable loss and developing 
partnerships). The following results do not follow a chronological stream of thought 
from the participants but are organized as the authors best see fit.  
4.1 Differences due to expertise in general  
The table below (Table 3: Variable description and analyses: Differences due to 
expertise in general) shows the raw data of the three constructs to better clarify if 
there is in fact a difference in the thought process between our expert entrepreneurs 
and EENs.  
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Variable description and analyses: Differences due to expertise in general. 
Construct  Variable description  Descriptive Experts   EENs  
       Statistics Mean Mean 
Analogical   Total number of words the  Expert: 
reasoning   participants used to complete Max: 3346 2190 2561  
   the scenerio   Min: 1114      
       EENs: 
       Max: 3345 
Min: 1568 
 
Analogical  Number of markets  Expert: 
reasoning  identified by each subject  Max: 2  1.33 3.33   
       Min: 1 
       EENs: 
       Max: 5 
       Min: 2 
           
Analogical  Subjects articulated an  Expert:     
reasoning  alternative segment during  1Y, 2N    
   the scenario (Y/N)  EENs:      
       3Y, 0N    
 
Holistic and  Number of thoughts relating Expert: 
conceptual   to the business but outside  Max: 0  0 2 
thinking   scenario    Min: 0  
       EENs: 
       Max: 4 
       Min: 0    
        
Weighting of  Subjects believed and  Expert:    
(predictive)  accepted the market research 2Y, 1N    
information  numbers in the scenario  EENs:      
   (Y/N)    3Y, 0N     
 
Control variable  Count of times subjects uses Expert: 
  intuition or gut feel to make Max: 1  0.33 2.33 
   decisions   Min: 0     
       EENs: 
       Max: 4 
       Min: 1   
Table 3 
 
4.1.1 Analogical reasoning 
The empirical results show that in fact EENs demonstrated more analogical reasoning 
in every construct than their expert counterparts. EENs spoke a combined 2115 more 
words (7684 words in total versus 5569) to complete the scenario. As can be seen in 
the above table (Table 3: Variable description and analyses: Differences due to 
expertise in general) experts spoke an average number of 2190 words compared to 
EENs with 2561 words, that is an average difference of 371 words between the two 
groups. EENs found 10 distinct markets for this product while experts found 4. This 
gives us an average of 3 identified markets for EENs and only 1 for experts. As in 
Table 3: Variable description and analyses: Differences due to expertise in general, 
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the maximum number of markets found by any one participant was 5, as identified by 
a novice, Nathan. In comparison, experts Eric and Ethan both identified only one 
market. When solving the case, all three EENs visualized alternative target market 
segments, finding a total of 4 while only one expert found a single alternative target 
market/segment. 
 
4.1.2 Holistic and conceptual thinking 
Holistic and conceptual thinking was analyzed by investigating to what extent the 
subjects viewed this project as a complete business as opposed to a one off project. 
Insufficient data was generated to draw valid results on holistic and conceptual 
thinking. Only one expert, Ethan, dealt with the business as a whole mentioning his 
concerns for numbers and his personal finances. This will be discussed later in 
regards to affordable loss versus expected returns, with the data in Table 4: Variable 
description and analyses: Differences due to entrepreneurial expertise, showing a 
maximum of 4 mentions. Paradoxically, all other subjects thought of the business 
more as a project, giving insufficient data about their holistic and conceptual thinking. 
 
4.1.3 Weighting of (predictive) information 
All EENs trusted the market research given and believed the numbers presented. One 
expert, Ethan, discounted the predictive information and felt that doubling the 
numbers would be more accurate. Ethan’s result be seen in Table 3: Variable 
description and analyses: Differences due to expertise in general, as the single ‘No’ 
value under weighting of (predictive) information. Ethan felt that he would need to 
conduct new research himself as opposed to believing what he read in the study, 
however he was the only expert to feel this way.  
 
EENs were almost 7 times more likely than experts to draw on intuition. Only one 
expert referred to a gut feeling once, when compared to EENs averaging 2.33 times 
each. This can be demonstrated in the coding scheme as using specific keywords such 
as; “gut feeling”, “intuition”, “opinion” or “personal experience” when solving the 
case. This is demonstrated in Table 3: Variable description and analyses: Differences 
due to expertise in general, with Nolan representing the maximum score of 4 times, 
whereas experts Edward and Ethan did not refer to their intuition at all.  
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4.2 Difference due to entrepreneurial expertise 
We now turn our attention to the empirical findings regarding possible differences 
due to entrepreneurial expertise between the two groups. Our experts have over 20 
years more experience in entrepreneurship on average than their EEN counterparts, as 
can be seen in Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the expert and EEN samples. It is 
worth exploring how or if our groups differ in regards to the use of means-driven or 
goal-driven actions, do they focus on affordable loss rather than expected returns and 
what their views are on building partnerships when starting a new venture.  
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Variable description and analyses: Differences due to entrepreneurial expertise 
Construct  Variable description  Descriptive Experts EENs 
       Statistics Mean Mean  
Means-driven as  Number of times a subject  Expert: 
opposed to   drew on personal experience Max: 1   .33 2.33  
goals-driven action     Min: 0     
       EENs: 
       Max: 4 
       Min: 1 
   
Affordable loss as Times a subject mentioned Expert: 
opposed to   the availability of money or  Max: 4  1.67 .67   
expected return  cost of an option   Min: 0     
       EENs: 
       Max: 2 
       Min: 0 
 
Affordable loss as Total number of segments  Expert: 
opposed to  chosen by subject   Max: 1  1 1.5  
expected return  (2nd priority segments count Min: 1     
   as .5 of a choice)   EENs: 
       Max: 3 
       Min: 1 
       
 
Partnerships as  Times subjects mentioned  Expert: 
opposed to  partnerships activities   Max: 9  4.33 3.67  
competitive analysis     Min: 1 
       EENs: 
       Max: 9 
       Min: 1      
       
Control variable for:   
Partnerships as  Subjects choice of direct sales Expert:   
opposed to  as a channel   3Y, 0N     
competitive  scenario (Y/N)   EENs:     
analysis       3Y, 0N   
 
Partnerships as  Subjects choosing direct   Expert:  
opposed to  channel and personally  3Y, 0N     
competitive  approaching customers  EENs:    
analysis   (Y/N)    3Y, 0N   
Table 4 
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4.2.1 Means-driven vs. goal-driven action 
An effectual approach is to focus on means-driven action as opposed to goal-driven 
action. Experts were less likely to mention their personal experience when making 
decisions. EENs mentioned how they had done things in the past in total 7 times, with 
Nolan referring to his experience while making decisions 4 times as represented by 
the maximum score in Table 4: Variable description and analyses: Differences due to 
entrepreneurial expertise. Only one expert, Eric, mentioned past experience when 
making decisions during the case, while Ethan and Edward represent the minimum 
score of 0 in Table 4: Variable description and analyses: Differences due to 
entrepreneurial expertise, by not mentioning it at all.  
 
 “I would do what I’ve done in the past … and look at where I was standing today.” –Eric 
 
Experts were more likely to use their current network to sell to (whom I know?) while 
EENs talked about creating a network. As can be seen by the above quote from Eric, a 
common theme throughout the experts’ decisions was leveraging their established 
network they had built up through their experience. In contrast to this, EENs were 
more likely to talk about creating a network in order to achieve their goals. 
 
There wasn’t sufficient data from the instrument to analyze how our participants 
viewed their use of resources (who am I?). Both groups mentioned that they would 
start with what they had. In particular, EENs talked more about using universities to 
both sell and promote the product, because:  
 
“…that specific group spreads the word much faster.” -Nolan 
 
This was an extension of EENs building on their previous experience of being at 
university where they were familiar. It is important to note that they did not mention 
an established network at the university, instead they felt more comfortable creating 
one in this environment and could more clearly see the benefits due to their 
experience in this area, as can be seen in the above quote.  
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4.2.2 Affordable loss vs. Expected returns 
An effectual approach is to focus on affordable loss rather than expected returns. The 
difference between the two groups was fairly wide in regards to looking at what they 
could afford to loose rather than the possible expected returns. Experts were more 
concerned about the availability of money or how much it would cost. Experts 
mentioned their concerns, on average almost twice, while EENs less than once each. 
As can be seen in Table 4: Variable description and analyses: Differences due to 
entrepreneurial expertise, the maximum value of 4 was from Ethan who was 
concerned about how much he could afford to lose. In contrast to this, none of the 
EENs expressed any concern at all about loss, as represented by the minimum figure 
in Table 4: Variable description and analyses: Differences due to entrepreneurial 
expertise.  
 
Experts only chose 3 market segments, which is half of what the EENs chose (6 in 
total). Experts were more careful to choose their segments in regards to the ‘low 
hanging fruits’, what they could afford to loose and their expected returns on 
investment. 
 
 “Before taking on big investments, that includes before attracting any venture capital, I would try to 
identify what strategy is the quickest possible way to make this break even.” -Eric 
 
As can be seen in the above quote, experts were more cautious and took a narrower 
scope strategy. They wanted to take their time building the venture, break even as 
soon as possible while not taking as many risks. They took on more of a slow and 
steady approach to build upon, as opposed to the EENs who were comfortable to take 
on heavy investments and go for rapid, aggressive growth. 
 
EENs were more focused on expected returns without regard to losses. Nolan 
suggested that this game could: 
 
“…become the new standard for getting investments by showing investors your score in the game.”  
–Nolan 
 
He went further to state that your score in this game would be similar for investors as 
to what the TOEFL test results are to universities. This view of aggressive growth was 
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consistent amongst our EENs who were more concerned with how big their 
possibilities were, and not concerned with the risk it would take to get there. 
 
EENs mentioned and identified more markets and segments. As represented in Table 
4: Variable description and analyses: Differences due to entrepreneurial expertise, 
with the EENs max value of 3 compared to the max value of experts of 1. Nolan 
mentioned a maximum of 4 new markets (2nd priority segments warrant .5 of a value 
in the table), while experts Eric and Ethan both did not identify any.  
 
EENs saw this product as a bigger opportunity than their expert counterparts.  
 
“There is no reason for the kids not to play this game because they’re smart. So growth possibilities are 
huge.” –Nathan 
 
EENs view of the product is shown well in the quote above. Experts wanted to take 
more time in researching before acting while EENs wanted to dive right in. The EENs 
were generally more excited by the opportunity and were blindfolded to any 
drawbacks or limitations. In contrast to this, as seen in the first quote of this section 
by Eric, experts were very skeptical and wanted to move slower before becoming too 
involved.  
 
4.2.3 Partnerships vs. competitive analysis 
An effectual approach is to build partnerships rather than focus on competitive 
analysis. Both groups mentioned partnerships activities, with experts mentioning it 
slightly more often than EENs. This can be seen in Table 4: Variable description and 
analyses: Differences due to entrepreneurial expertise with Experts mentioning 
partnerships an average of 4.33 times compared to EENs 3.67 times. As shown in 
Table 4: Variable description and analyses: Differences due to entrepreneurial 
expertise, with all responses as ‘Yes’, there was absolutely no difference in subject’s 
decisions to sell directly and all chose to personally contact customers. 
 
“So I would sell this product initially into a market segment that already had databases of potential 
customers for the end product… rather than trying to sell it directly from my own website. I think I 
would look for strategic partners that have got databases.” –Edward 
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The above quote shows the most indirect route of market entry chosen by any 
participant in the study. Despite the distanced selling method, it still involved direct 
selling and extensive work with customers. 
 
Although both groups were focused on building partnerships, we found a fundamental 
difference in their approach. EENs were not worried about competitors at all and 
looked to build partnerships where they themselves got more out of the cooperation 
than the other party. EENs looked into partnering with universities to promote, 
sponsor and use the product. Nolan wanted to take 10 minutes from a university 
lecture to promote the product to students, while Nathan wanted schools to finance 
the development of the product and they would take the risk. Experts had a very 
different approach from EENs: 
 
“When I am analyzing the competitors, questions asked could be related to the market size, number of 
customers, how much they are paying, and what kinds of services? Understand the competitors views 
of their customers. What kind of problems are they solving? Asking competitors what are their plans 
ahead? And what kind of products are they designing? Have they tried out different products? Different 
services in the past that did not succeed? … Try to identify patterns and see if you can arrange the 
competitors into different categories... read their financial data and stuff like that.” -Eric 
 
As can be seen, experts focused on extensive competitive analysis and felt that 
finding out what, why and how the competitors were acting would help them to 
strategically build their approach. They went so far as to use specifics such as SWOT 
analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) to determine what their 
competitive advantages would be. 
 
Experts were focused on creating a balanced partnership, creating ‘win-win’ 
situations for both parties and turning potential competitors into partners: 
 
“I think it could be one of those situations where potential competitors could be turned into potential 
customers once they realize how it can be used and what the value of the product is.” -Edward 
 
This approach was very different to EENs who were interested in forming rather one-
sided partnerships, expressing almost no intentions in adding value to the potential 
partners. 
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Experts looked at the whole picture, even if that meant being a small partner in 
something bigger rather than being a majority owner in something of a higher 
uncertainty: 
 
“The best way to get in is there’s this company building this rocket ship simulator and they are already 
known to the school board. Why don’t I just go and sell my idea to them or join forces … merge or 
something and I could add this to their portfolio. It competes but it gives them an alternative to go to 
school boards with. Together we could probably make more money than if I started from scratch.  So 
that is a definite thing I would go for.” –Ethan 
 
As mentioned in the affordable loss results, experts were interested in targeting the 
“low hanging fruits”. As can be seen in the above quote, they wanted the best market 
strategy even if that meant giving up some of the ownership. They wanted to use 
strategic partners wherever they could to leverage existing channels. In contrast, 
EENs strategies were more selfish and they showed more resistance in giving up 
anything in return for the partnership. 
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5. Discussion 
Our empirical results show a distinct difference in how EENs and expert 
entrepreneurs solved the case. Our findings suggest that EENs are not as causal as we 
initially expected, but are in fact more effectual than their expert counterparts. 
Karlsson and Moberg (2013) pointed out that entrepreneurship has a trait-based view 
where some believe you are either born with the necessary traits or not. Drucker 
(1985) found that entrepreneurship is neither magic nor has anything to do with genes 
but a discipline and as such it can be learned. Kuratko (2005) argued that certain 
aspects of entrepreneurship can be learned, and according to Sarasvathy (2008) 
effectuation is one of them. Based on our results, we found that expert entrepreneurs 
were able to choose between causal and effectual logics as the situation saw fit. 
EENs, however, were only able to draw from effectual logics. This is in line with 
Sarasvathy’s (2008) findings that suggest effectual approaches are used when 
entrepreneurs have limited resources.  
 
“as … entrepreneurial expertise grows, one would expect them to become more discerning in their use 
of appropriate logics for any given situation.” 
(Sarasvathy, 2008, p.132) 
 
Sarasvathy (2008) claims that experts prefer effectual actions when starting new 
ventures. Based on this, we believe our experts successes and failures have taught 
them how and when it is appropriate to use causal approaches. Due to our EENs lack 
of experience with developing a venture to a point of causation they do not have the 
level of expertise to choose between the two approaches. Because of this, experts are 
more adaptive to new situations.  
 
From this, our results lead us to wonder if the emphasis on effectuation has gone too 
far in entrepreneurship education. Are our EENs more effectual because of their 
education? Have they never had to develop a causal logic due to the immaturity of 
their ventures? Or could it simply be their young age or naivety as entrepreneurs?  
We will now look more closely at both expertise in general as well as differences due 
to entrepreneurial expertise to further elaborate on the results. 
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5.1 Expertise in general 
5.1.1 Analogical reasoning 
As shown in our empirical results, EENs were more inclined to look beyond the 
information given, identified more distinct markets and even articulated more 
alternative market segments during the scenario. This is in stark contrast to what Dew 
et al. (2009) found in their study where only 5% of novices visualized alternative 
target market segments. Our EENs saw bigger opportunities, talked more and never 
doubted that the opportunity presented in the case would be a success. We believe this 
can be attributed to the experience of our experts. The caution shown by our experts 
to move slowly and start with fewer market segments may be because they have 
failed in their past experiences. In contrast to this, the EENs limited experience with 
failure and hardship leads to their confidence. Our results suggest that we can expect 
EENs to be more aggressive and confident in the early stages of venture creation, and 
these traits to be less apparent as their experience develops. 
5.1.2 Holistic and conceptual thinking 
Insufficient data was drawn to make any conclusions about experts and EENs holistic 
and conceptual thinking. Our results do show that experts were more likely to look at 
the business venture as a whole and establish a brand while EENs perceived it as a 
one-time opportunity for quick profit. Unfortunately, there was not enough discourse 
on the subject to develop any further conclusions. 
 
5.1.3 Weighting of (predictive) information 
All EENs believed and accepted the market research given, while some experts in our 
sample doubted it. This suggests that EENs lack the business experience of working 
with real data. Our EENs have learned many of their entrepreneurial skills in the 
classroom through case studies. Since the data in these studies is most often given, it 
must simply be believed and is rarely doubted. Experts made strategic decisions to 
doubt the data given, likely because they have been presented with unreliable data in 
their entrepreneurial experience. Hodgkinson et al. (1999) claim that strategic 
decision-makers employ the ‘rule of thumb’ principle to cope with complex and 
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uncertain decisions. They simplify assumptions to reduce the burden of processing the 
information. 
 
As well as accepting the data given, EENs were seven times more likely to use 
their “gut feeling”, “intuition” or “opinion” when solving the case. We believe that 
EENs have to rely on their ‘gut feeling’ rather than actual experience in their 
decision-making since they have less experience to build from. Experts seemed more 
confident in how they solved the case and expressed their thoughts without 
specifically mentioning that it was their “gut feeling”, “intuition” or “opinion” but 
rather something they would just do. This can be seen by fewer words spoken and 
mentioning fewer distinct market segments.  
 
Moreover, the weighting of information differently could be related to the experts’ 
scrutiny of the data. The experts may have been more discerning towards the data 
given as they were basing their decisions more solidly on it, as apposed to the EENs 
who took the data at face value and then went with their ‘gut’ decision. This could 
have led to the higher scores of experts doubting the data, and then higher scores of 
EENs going with their ‘gut’ decisions. 
 
The different weighting of information can have drastic effects on entrepreneurs. As 
EENs and experts treated the data differently, this could lead to very different 
decisions and outcomes. From our results, we can expect experts to be more 
discerning when it comes to information. As experts are more experienced, they can 
more easily see when something is off, enabling them to know when to believe the 
numbers and when not. This small factor can be a major factor in the difference 
between a novice and an expert as Dew et al. (2009) put it, the ability to achieve 
superior performance over time. 
5.2 Differences due to entrepreneurial expertise 
5.2.1 Means vs. goals 
As our empirical results show, to much of our surprise, the younger and less 
experienced EENs were more likely to draw on personal experience when solving the 
case. This finding may be due to the fact that EENs have more recently started a 
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company and have more experience with solving entrepreneurial cases in a classroom 
setting. Solving a case in a classroom setting as a part of entrepreneurial education is 
a well known process. Ronstadt (1987) proposed that programs in entrepreneurship 
should include case studies. Cases tend to address various methods of transferring 
expertise and information (Kuratko, 2005). Both groups wanted to sell directly to 
customers but they differed in their use of network. Experts wanted to sell to their 
current network, possibly due to their age and experience in the field, while EENs felt 
the need to create one. 
 
5.2.2 Affordable loss vs. expected return 
When solving the case, experts were more concerned with the money available to 
them while EENs were more likely to look at the expected returns. We found EENs 
more naive in their view of the case while experts were more concerned about 
breaking even and ensuring the long-term health of the venture. The naivety of EENs 
was demonstrated through their lofty expectations and their vague and disjointed 
approach to reach these goals. Alternatively, we found experts to be systemic in their 
approach where they demonstrated the steps they would take in the process. EENs 
chose twice as many market segments than experts and were more inclined to risk-
taking behaviors. We believe this is in part due to their naivety as entrepreneurs and 
irresponsible attitude often linked with younger people. For example, Hodgdon et al. 
(1981) found an overrepresentation of young driver accident involvement that could 
not be explained by their driving experience or skills. The reason they got into 
more accidents was the way they drove, speeding more frequently, unlikelier to 
wear seat belts and drove through yellow lights more often. Young drivers took more 
risk than older drivers and were therefore involved in more accidents (Finn and 
Bragg, 1986). We argue that the same thing could apply to young entrepreneurs who 
look at the upside of getting it all, disregarding the associated risks. 
 
5.2.3 Partnerships vs. competitive analysis 
If we look strictly at the counts in our empirical results the two groups were very 
similar in how many times they mentioned partnerships when developing their 
ventures (Table 4: Variable description and analyses: Differences due to 
entrepreneurial expertise: experts 4.33 times on average and EENs 3.67 times). 
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However, when we look at the results in more detail, taking into account how the two 
groups intended to use their partnerships we see a distinct difference in their 
approach. Experts wanted to create ‘win-win’ partnerships where both parties 
benefited from the collaboration. EENs were more inclined to develop partnerships by 
using the other party for their own benefit and never mentioned how others would 
benefit from working with them. ‘Win-win’ partnerships are a way to compete in the 
market and we have seen many previous competitors partner together to form strong 
alliances. For example, technology giants Intel and Apple have worked together for 
several years utilizing each other’s strengths. Johnston and Lawrence (1988) argued 
that an integral part of these relationships is to understand that all players in the value-
added chain need to be as strong as possible and have a stake in each other’s success 
for it to work. 
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6. Conclusion and implications 
In this paper, we wanted to compare if EENs make similar decisions to expert 
entrepreneurs in regards to effectuation and expertise in general. We expected EENs 
to demonstrate less effectuation in each of the six categories. Our results show 
however that our EENs are in fact even more effectual than our experts, contradicting 
our expectations. 
 
Out of the twelve counts measured, experts were only more effectual in terms of 
affordable loss rather than expected returns. The two groups were equally as effectual 
in five counts, whereas EENs were more effectual in the remaining six counts. These 
results were not expected and could imply that EENs use extreme effectual logics 
because they have never failed and not yet learned from their experience.  
 
The second aspect that we would like to address is how EENs expressed a more 
exploitive nature throughout their partnerships. They were interested solely in what 
they could gain from the partnership and not the value that could be created for both. 
Additionally, experts expressed more appreciation towards the questions, structure, 
depth and realism of the case. Moreover, they were more dynamic and strategic in 
their thought processes while EENs were more reactive, linear 
and compartmentalized. We see this relating back to the EENs inexperience as 
entrepreneurs. 
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7. Results summary 
Our EENs displayed strong effectual logics and were much closer to experts than 
originally expected. Because the data and results in our comparison study are not 
presented in a way to be analyzed separately, it is impossible for us to see whether the 
experts in our study and the comparison study are similar. If we assume they are, then 
we can argue that the causal/effectual gap between MBAs and EENs is tremendous 
(see Figure 1). We can conclude that programs in entrepreneurship do guide EENs 
closer to an expertise mindset than MBA programs when faced with starting new 
ventures. 
 
A visual representation of the Causal / Effectual differences. 
 
Dew et al. (2009)  Causal position-------------x------------------x----------------------Effectual position 
    MBAs          Experts 
Our study   Causal position--------------------------------x---------x------------Effectual position 
             Experts   EENs 
Figure 1 
 
There are three main reasons that could explain this. First of all, people who choose 
entrepreneurship as a career path might be fundamentally different and more risk 
seeking than those who choose the safer MBA route. Secondly, a year of studying 
entrepreneurship might make them significantly more effectual as opposed to MBA 
programs, which according to Sarasvathy (2008) focus more on causal logics. Finally, 
EENs might be going through a developmental phase of their early entrepreneurial 
career, leaving them too optimistic. 
 
The EENs extreme effectual logic might be useful when starting new ventures but 
harmful if they cannot adapt to causal approaches when that is needed. Possibly the 
best thing would be for EENs to fail often and early, and reflect on those failures in 
order to grow into expert entrepreneurs.  
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8. Limitations and suggestion for 
further research 
8.1 Limitations 
The major limitation of our study is the limited sample size of both groups. This was 
taken into account when our results were interpreted. Generalizing should be done 
with caution since the three participants in each group could be unique and not 
representative of the EEN or expert population as a whole. Due to the small sample 
size we cannot rule out that between and within group differences might have affected 
our results and a bigger sample of at least 30 participants in each group is needed to 
verify our findings. In addition, expertise in a field related to the one presented in the 
case, such as simulation or education gaming, could further affect the outcome of this 
study. This is due to the limited sample size and respondents not being ruled out nor 
chosen due to their particular industry experience within entrepreneurship. 
 
Jaaskelainen (2010) has pointed out that think-aloud protocols do have their 
limitations as only information in working memory can be verbalized, leaving 
unconscious processing unanalyzed. The researchers lack of experience in 
conducting, transcribing and coding should also be taken into consideration. 
 
Using EENs as a comparison group does indeed have its limiting effect on the results, 
as they are considerably younger. Age, as argued by Schaie and Willis (2002) could 
lead to our findings since it can influence cognitive processes over time. This 
limitation is not easy to avoid considering the parameters we set for each group. 
Experts had to have ten years of entrepreneurial experience, started at least three 
ventures and sold at least one of them. Novices on the other hand were recent 
graduates from university and have started their own venture in the past three years. 
Based solely on this definition alone, we could immediately expect an age difference 
of at least seven years.  
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Since the case itself was solved in a “classroom” setting we can expect EENs to be 
more comfortable and familiar with solving such cases due to their entrepreneurial 
studies. In contrast to this, solving a case on paper is something our experts might not 
have experienced and could limit their performance.  
8.2 Suggestion for further research 
Based on our findings, we feel that several aspects merit further research. A similar 
study with a larger sample would be needed to verify our results, and a longitudinal 
study of how entrepreneurs acquire expertise over time would shed more light on the 
process. To see the effect entrepreneurship education has on the thought processes of 
students, it would be relevant to have new students in entrepreneurship programs 
solve a case both at the start and end of their studies. This would give researchers a 
glimpse into how effectual/causal the students were when they started and if in fact 
the studies made them more effectual.  
 
Another area for further research would be to verify if students who enter programs in 
entrepreneurship are more risk seeking compared to a comparison group. This would 
help determine whether entrepreneurship students are more risk seeking than average 
before embarking on their studies or if it is something they learn during their 
education. Lastly, it would be interesting to compare failure in young entrepreneurs. 
That is, to see if studying entrepreneurship actually saves you time in the long run 
when building a successful venture or if that time would have been better utilized out 
in the field. 
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10. Appendix 
Appendix A. Research instrument / The Case 
As our study is to follow up on the research done by Dew et. al. (2009) we have 
used their research instrument and slightly modified it to fit our context and 
needs by changing the currency from $ to SEK and the names of stores in the US 
to a Swedish brands. It is almost the exact same case as presented by Dew et.al 
(2009) so we can better compare our results with those in that study. However we 
will focus more on seeing how novices act differently from experts and looks 
specifically at entrepreneurial expertise. 
Introduction 
In the following experiment, you will solve two decision problems. These problems arise 
in the context of building a new company for an imaginary product. A detailed 
description of the product follows this introduction. 
Although the product is imaginary, it is technically feasible and financially viable. The 
data for the problems have been obtained through realistic market research - the kind of 
market research used in developing a real world business plan. 
Before you start on the product description and the problems, We need one act of 
creative imagination on your part. We request you to put yourself in the role of the 
an entrepreneur building a company — i.e., you have a little money of your own 
to start this company, and whatever experience you have to date. 
Throughout the experiment you should talk aloud the thoughts you are having. This is 
merely for us to record your thought process. Please start by reading aloud the following 
instructions and the rest of the case. 
Description of the product 
You have created a computer game of entrepreneurship. You believe you can combine 
this game with some educational material and profiles of successful entrepreneurs to 
make an excellent teaching tool for entrepreneurship. Your inspiration for the product 
came from several reports in the newspapers and magazines about increasing demand for 
entrepreneurship education; and the fact that a curriculum involving entrepreneurship 
even at the junior high school or high school level induces students to learn not only 
business-related topics but math and science and communication skills as well. 
The game part of the product consists of a simulated environment for starting and 
running a company. There are separate sub-simulations of markets, competitors, 
regulators, macroeconomic factors and a random factor for “luck”. The game has a 
sophisticated multi-media interface - for example, a 3D office where phones ring with 
messages from the market, a TV that will provide macroeconomic information when 
switched on, and simulated managerial staff with whom the player (CEO) can consult in 
making decisions. At the beginning of the game, the player can choose from a variety of 
businesses the type of business he/she wants to start (For example: manufacturing, 
personal services, software etc.) and has to make decisions such as which market 
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segment to sell to, how many people to hire, what type of financing to go for, etc. 
During the game, the player has to make production decisions such as how much to 
produce, whether to build new warehouses or negotiate with trucking companies, etc.; 
marketing decisions such as which channels of distribution to use, which media to 
advertise in and so on; management decisions involving hiring, training, promoting and 
firing of employees, and so on. There is an accounting subroutine that tracks and 
computes the implications of the various decisions for the bottom line. The simulation's 
responses to the player's decisions permit a range of possible final outcomes - from 
bankruptcy to a “hockey stick”. 
  You have taken all possible precautions regarding intellectual property. The name 
of your company is Entrepreneurship, Inc. The name of the product is Venturing. 
Problem 1: Identifying the market 
Before we look at some market research data, please answer the following 
questions - one at a time: (Remember to continue thinking aloud as you arrive at your 
decisions and take all the time you need.) 
1. Who could be your potential customers for this product? 
2. Who could be your potential competitors for this product? 
3. What information would you seek about potential customers and competitors 
- list questions you would want  answered. 
4. How will you find out this information - what kind of market research would 
you do? 
5. What do you think are the growth possibilities for this company? 
Problem 2: Defining the market .  
In this problem you have to make some marketing decisions. Based on secondary 
market research (published sources, etc.), you estimate that there are three major 
segments who are interested in the product: 
Segment         Estimated total size 
Young adults between 15-25 years old     20 million 
Adults over 25 years old who are curious about entrepreneurship  30 million 
Educators        200.000 institutions 
 
• The estimated dollar value of the instructional technology market is $1.7 
billion. 
• The estimated dollar value of the interactive simulation game market is $800 
million. 
• Both are expected to grow at a minimum rate of 20% p.a. for the next 5 
years. 
The following are the results of the primary (direct) market research that you have completed 
Survey #1 — Internet users were allowed to download a scaled down version (game stops after 15 min of 
playing) of the prototype and were asked to fill out a questionnaire. 
You get 600 hits per day. 300 actually download the product. You have 500 filled out 
questionnaires. 
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Willing to pay (SEK) Young adults (%)  Adults (%)  Educators (%) 
350-700   45   26   52 
700-1000  32   38   30 
1000-1300  15   22   16 
1300-1600  8   9   2 
1600-2000  0   5   0 
Total   100   100   100 
 
Survey #2: The prototype was demonstrated at 2 Akademibokhandeln and 3 Bokia stores in Sweden. 
 
Willing to pay (SEK) Young adults (%)  Adults (%)  Educators (%) 
350-700   51   21   65 
700-1000  42   49   18 
1000-1300  7   19   10 
1300-1600  0   8   7 
1600-2000  0   3   0 
Total   100   100   100 
 
Survey #3:Focus Group of educators (high school & community college teachers and administrators). 
The educators who participated in the focus group found the product exciting and 
useful, but want several additions and modifications made before they would be willing 
to pay a price of over 1000 SEK for it. As it is, they would be willing to pay 350-700 
SEK and would demand a discount on that for site licenses or bulk (big) orders. Both at 
the bookstore demo and the focus group, participants are very positive and enthusiastic 
about the product. They provide you good feedback on specific features and also extend 
suggestions for improvement. But the educators are particularly keen on going beyond 
the “game” aspect; they make it clear that much more development and support would 
be required in trying to market the product to them. They also indicate that there are 
non-profit foundations and other funding sources interested in entrepreneurship that 
might be willing to promote the product and fund its purchase by educational 
institutions. 
Based on your market research, you arrive at the following cost estimates for marketing your product. 
 
Internet    10.000 SEK upfront + 3000 SEK per month thereafter. 
Retailers    3-5 million upfront and support services and follow-up thereafter. 
Mail order catalogs  Relatively cheap, but ads and demos could cost 300.000 SEK upfront. 
Direct selling to schools  Involves recruiting and training sales representatives except locally. 
 
Competition 
None of the following four possible competitors combine a simulation game with 
substantial education materials — you are unique in this respect. 
 
Company Product  Description   Price per unit Sales (SEK) 
Maxis  Sim City  Urban Planning Simulator  200 SEK 200 M. 
Microprose Civilization Civilization Building Simulation 350 SEK 130 M. 
Sierro On-Line Caesar  City Building Simulation  400 SEK 120 M. 
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Future Endeavors Scholastic Treetop CD-ROMs of Scholastic Books n/a  6,5 M. 
(New Co. <1 year old.) 
 
The game companies are making a net return of 25% on sales. 
At this point, please take your time and make the following decisions: (please continue to 
think-aloud as you arrive at your decisions) 
1. Which market segment/segments will you sell your product to?  
2. How will you price your product?  
3. How will you sell to your selected market segment/segments? 
------ 
This signals the end of the study. Thank you for you participation. 
Ingvi Hrannar Ómarsson & Stephen Batley 
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Appendix B. Coding scheme 
 
• University Educational background: 
• When did you start your first official company: 
• How many companies have you started: 
• Years worked for your ventures: 
• Have you sold a company: 
• Year of Birth: 
 
1. Overall 
1a. Total number of WORDS of text for each subject: ________words 
1b. Did this person believe the numbers? Enter Yes or No 
1c. Did this person mention any of the following? Enter yes or no and the count of 
their mentions: 
 
 
Gut feeling        Intuition 
My personal choice       In my opinion 
Total “gut feeling” count: 
 
 
1d. Did this person worry about how much money he or she has and what the costs of 
executing his or her marketing decisions will be? Enter yes or no 
1e. If yes, count how many times they mentioned their concern: 
 
1f. Did this person go beyond making marketing decisions to talk about building the 
business as a whole? Enter yes or no 
1g. If yes, count how many times they mentioned each of the following: 
 
What it would take to put a sales force together: 
Issues related to the long term: 
Theorizing about entrepreneurial decisions/actions: 
Insights from previous experience: 
Insights from case studies/classes: 
 
2. Partnerships/affiliations/relationships 
2a. Did this person visualize partnering or building a relationship with someone? 
Enter yes or no  
 2b. If yes, count number of partnerships they visualized: 
 
3. Segment decision 
3a. Did this person actually decide on one or more segments? Enter yes or no 
3b. Did this person decide to sell to all three segments? Enter yes or no 
3c. If this person chose more than one segment, was it simultaneous or prioritized? 
Enter S or P 
 
4. Number of new markets 
4a. Who could be your potential customers for this product? 
4b. What do you think the growth opportunities are for this company? 
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4c. Did this person visualize new segments other than the ones suggested? Enter 
yes or no 4d. If yes, list the new segments: 
 
5. Channel decision 
 5a. Check off channels they used: 
   
  Internet  Retail  Mail order catalog Direct sales 
 
 5b. Direct sales: 
I will personally contact:  
I will recruit salespeople: 
 
